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This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay, and incentives
under risk aversion and moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a
single closed-form equation. In the presence of moral hazard, assignment is distorted from
positive assortative matching on rm size as rms with higher risk or disutility choose less
talented CEOs. Such rms also pay higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-
wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO do not a¤ect pay. The strength
of incentives depends only on the disutility of e¤ort and is independent of risk and risk
aversion. If the CEO can a¤ect rm risk, incentives rise and are increasing in risk and
risk aversion. We calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance,
such as failures in monitoring and ine¢ ciencies in CEO assignment.
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This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives.
Risk-averse managers of di¤erent talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous
rms, which vary in their size, risk, and level of e¤ort required. The level of pay drives the
assignment of talent to rms. The strength of incentives induces the e¢ cient e¤ort level, and
is determined by an optimal contracting approach.
Our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a CEO market equilibrium in a tractable
manner. A large empirical literature has shown that risk is a rst-order determinant of com-
pensation contracts (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Garen (1994), Core and Guay (1999), Oyer
and Schaefer (2004), Peters (2009), Peters and Wagner (2009)) but most theories assume risk-
neutrality. This assumption is often necessitated the fact that adding risk aversion is typically
a non-trivial extension that leads to highly complex contracts. Often, the contract cannot be
solved in closed form, which makes it di¢ cult to understand the economic intuition and see
which features of the environment are driving which features of the contract. While Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) develop frameworks that allow closed-form contracts under risk aversion,
both consider only a single agent rather than a market containing multiple principals and mul-
tiple agents. Thus, most papers are forced to assume risk neutrality, for tractability rather than
empirical realism.
We attempt a rst step towards bridging the gap between theory and empirics by adding
risk aversion into a model that features both a talent assignment problem and moral hazard.
In an extension, we also allow risk to be inuenced by the CEO rather than being an exoge-
nous parameter. Despite the rich setup, the equilibrium can be summarized by three simple,
closed-form equations, one for each of assignment, pay, and incentives. We achieve this by
using the tractable incentive contracts developed by Edmans and Gabaix (2010). The models
tractability allow its economic forces to be transparent, yields clear empirical predictions for
which factors do and do not matter for the three outcomes, and allows analysis of welfare con-
sequences. Combining these three questions within a unifying framework generates a number
of new implications unattainable from piecing together the results of individual models of each
issue in isolation.
Despite the potential complexity caused by combining a talent assignment model with an
agency problem under risk aversion, the equilibrium can be summarized by three simple, closed-
form equations, one for each of assignment, pay, and incentives. The models tractability allow
its economic forces to be transparent, yields clear empirical predictions for which factors do and
do not matter for the three outcomes, and allows analysis of welfare consequences. Combining
these three questions within a unifying framework generates a number of new implications
unattainable from piecing together the results of individual models of each issue in isolation.
First, we start with talent assignment. As in standard assignment theories, we model talent
as a¤ecting the maximum rm value that can be achieved in the absence of an agency problem.
Without moral hazard, more talented CEOs work at larger rms to allow their talent to have the
greatest impact. We show that this allocation is distorted in the presence of an agency problem.
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A talented manager is a mixed blessing for two reasons. First, if utility is multiplicative in cash
and e¤ort, exerting e¤ort is more costly to a talented and thus wealthy manager (e.g., a day of
leisure is particularly valuable to a rich CEO as he can enjoy his wealth in leisure time). Thus,
the rm must pay a rich CEO a greater premium for disutility of e¤ort. Second, a manager
who is already wealthy is less motivated by incentive pay and more willing to sacrice it for
leisure. The rm must therefore provide him with stronger incentives, which requires paying
him a premium for risk. With multiplicative preferences, stock holdings must rise in proportion
to his wage; combined with CRRA utility, this means the risk premium is also proportional to
the wage. Thus, rms involving greater risk or disutility must pay particularly high premiums
to hire talented managers, and so may prefer to appoint a poor-and-hungry CEO rather
than a rich-and-contented alternative.1 Some talented managers are hired by small rms,
where their talent a¤ects fewer assets, if such rms involve lower risk or disutility. While it is
well-known that moral hazard under risk aversion leads to ine¢ cient risk-sharing, we show in
a market equilibrium that it also distorts real production.
We obtain closed-form solutions for the losses in total surplus due to ine¢ cient risk-sharing
and talent misallocation. The former depends on the average level of risk in the economy; the
latter depends on the cross-sectional variance of risk but not its mean. If risk is high but constant
across rms, it has no e¤ect on a CEOs choice of employer and so assignment is not distorted.
The losses from misallocating managers are also increasing in the dispersion of managerial
ability, as is intuitive. More surprisingly, they are decreasing in the dispersion of rm size and
the size elasticity of talent. When size is more dispersed, or talent has a particularly strong
impact on large rms, size becomes more important than risk in determining the equilibrium
matching. Thus, assignment becomes closer to the e¢ cient positive assortative matching on
size. The sum of both ine¢ ciencies is a measure of the losses from boardsfailure to control
moral hazard through monitoring. If they instead must solve moral hazard through contracts,
such contracts create distortions even if they are set optimally. Thus, direct monitoring and
incentives are not perfect substitutes as governance mechanisms.
Second, the level of pay is increasing in rm size as in a pure assignment model. The addition
of an agency problem means that pay also depends on a rms disutility and risk, as the CEO
demands a premium for bearing them. Thus, rms with high risk or disutility not only hire
less talented CEOs, but also pay their CEOs more relative to their skill level. Cross-sectionally,
riskier rms pay more as found by Garen (1994); greater disutility has the same e¤ect. Gayle
and Miller (2009) show that rms that are more complex to manage or have greater agency
problems (and thus stronger required incentives) pay their executives more.
However, what matters is not the absolute level of these parameters, but their magnitudes
1Note that CEOs in our model have the same utility function. Thus, it is not that a poor-and-hungryCEO
has a di¤erent cost of e¤ort or risk aversion coe¢ cient. CEOs di¤er only in their talent and thus reservation
wage. Owing to multiplicative preferences, di¤erences in the reservation wage translate into di¤erences in the
tendency to shirk, even though the utility function is not CEO-specic.
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compared to other rms in the economy. Thus, aggregate changes in risk or the disutility of
being a CEO (e.g., due to regulation or increasingly activist shareholders) do not a¤ect pay:
while working for ones current rm becomes less attractive, so do the outside options. This
conclusion di¤ers from the partial equilibrium model of Hermalin (2005), who argues that the
recent strengthening in corporate governance increases the level of e¤ort the CEO must exert
and the risk of dismissal, and thus may explain the rise in pay over time. We show that in
a market equilibrium, such economy-wide changes have no e¤ect. Indeed, Peters and Wagner
(2009) nd that the e¤ect on pay of dismissal risk is eight times as high along the cross-section
as over the time series. The dependence of pay on outside options also highlights the importance
of controlling for aggregate conditions (or at least time trends) in empirical analyses of pay.
Third, the strength of incentives is measured by the percentage change in CEO pay for a
percentage rm return. It depends only on the disutility of e¤ort and is independent of both
risk and risk aversion.
The above core model is presented in Section 1. In Section 2, we extend the model to
allow the CEOs actions to a¤ect the variance as well as mean of rm returns. Specically,
actions that improve the average return also increase risk, such as the undertaking of a risky,
positive-NPV project. While diversied shareholders do not care about idiosyncratic risk, a
risk-averse CEO has private incentives to ine¢ ciently forgo such a project. Therefore, if the
CEO is more risk averse than a log agent, the contract becomes more convex to give the
CEO a benet from risk to o¤set his risk aversion. This result contrasts the argument that
powerful incentives induce the CEO to take excessive risk, and thus if the CEO has control
over risk, incentives should be weaker. Moreover, incentives are now increasing in risk and risk
aversion, contrary to traditional models, which assume exogenous risk and predict a negative
relationship. When the CEO is more risk-averse or the rm is riskier, it is necessary to give him
even more convexity (and thus stronger incentives) to induce him to undertake a value-creating
risky project. Indeed, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Schaefer
(2004), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) nd a positive relationship between incentives
and risk. For the same reason, incentives are increasing in the marginal increase in risk caused
by value-enhancing actions. If the CEO mainly a¤ects rm value by consuming perks, these
actions have little e¤ect on risk and so incentives are weaker, but if the CEO creates value by
choosing risky projects, incentives are stronger. The link between incentives and the e¤ect of
value-enhancing actions on risk has both cross-sectional and time-series implications. Along
the cross-section, new economyrms require the pursuit of risky growth opportunities (e.g.,
investing in R&D has little payo¤ if it fails). Indeed, Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) and
Murphy (2003) nd stronger incentives in new economy rms. Over time, as industries mature
and competition intensies due to globalization, sure-reprojects, which generate value with
little risk become scarce, and enhancing rm value increasingly requires risk-taking. This may
account for the rise in incentives, and in particular options, over time (e.g., Jensen and Murphy
2004.)
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Our nal theoretical extension allows for an elastic supply of CEO talent. We introduce
a second labor market involving non-CEO jobs (e.g., entrepreneurship or consulting), which
we call the non-corporate sector. This market provides both a secondary source from which
corporate rms can hire, and an outside option for CEOs. An aggregate increase in the disutility
of being a CEO (while holding constant the disutility of working in the non-corporate sector)
now augments CEO pay, as rms must compensate CEOs to deter them from leaving to the
non-corporate sector. Since the additional disutility is particularly costly for talented CEOs,
corporate rms hire less skilled managers, reducing the value created by the corporate sector.
The magnitude of the rise in pay, downgrade in talent, and value loss are all increasing in the
size of the non-corporate sector, as this represents the extent of CEOsoutside options.
The two-sector model can also be used to analyze the e¤ect of trends in a specic industry.
For example, one sectorcould represent the nancial industry, and the second all alternative
jobs for such CEOs. An increase in regulation of the nancial industry (e.g., in response to
the recent crisis) may cause talented CEOs to leave. Since the outside options for nancial
CEOs are extensive (hedge funds and private equity houses in addition to executive positions
at non-nancial corporations), the value loss to the nancial industry may be substantial.
Finally, our models closed form solutions allow a calibration of the ine¢ ciencies from various
forms of poor corporate governance. Aggregating over the 500 largest rms in ExecuComp, if
boards fail to monitor CEOs directly and instead must solve agency problems by contracting,
we estimate losses from ine¢ cient risk-sharing at $2.0 billion per year, and misallocation at
$7.7 billion; the latter is an upper bound. The total ine¢ ciency of $9.7 billion is approximately
twice the aggregate CEO salary. However, it is not substantial since rms are contracting
and selecting CEOs optimally (given they cannot directly observe e¤ort) and so the outcome is
second-best e¢ cient. A social planner also unable to observe e¤ort would not be able to improve
on the allocation. By contrast, if board failures instead lead to CEOs being randomly assigned
to rms while retaining optimal contracting, the losses are approximately $16 billion per year
as a lower bound. Our model thus allows analysis of the losses from various manifestations
of poor corporate governance. Naturally, all of these losses would be signicantly higher when
considering all top executives rather than just CEOs. Recent critics of governance focus on
ine¢ ciencies in contracting (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004). We show that, even if boards
set optimal contracts which are fully e¤ective at preventing the CEO from taking pet projects,
there can still be signicant value loss resulting from misallocation of talent. Our paper thus
highlights the importance of boards not only contracting e¢ ciently, but also making correct
hiring decisions a role that has received relatively less attention. The absence of corporate
scandals, excessive pay or perk consumption does not automatically mean that boards are
performing e¤ectively.
In addition to the results above, our paper makes two methodological contributions. One
is solving an assignment problem whereby rms di¤er in disutility and risk, as well as size.
In existing assignment models (e.g., Sattinger 1993; Gabaix and Landier 2008 (GL); Terviö
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2008), both rms and workers di¤er in a single dimension (size and talent, respectively) and thus
can be unambiguously ranked.2 This allows for a simple solution to the assignment problem 
positive assortative matching between the ranks. Assignment models are typically complex to
solve if one or both sides vary across multiple dimensions, because this makes ranking di¢ cult.
We show that risk and disutility can be combined with size into a single dimension, which we
call e¤ectivesize, which we can use to unambiguously rank rms and thus achieve a tractable
solution to a multidimensional allocation problem.
A second methodological contribution is achieving a closed-form solution to a model in
which the agent a¤ects the volatility, as well as mean of rm returns. Antecedents include
Sung (1995) and Ou-Yang (2003), who use the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) framework that
requires exponential utility, a nancial cost of e¤ort, continuous time, and Gaussian noise, and
Dittmann and Yu (2010) who assume separable preferences and Gaussian noise. We allow for
general noise distributions and non-separable utility.
This paper is related to a number of models of executive compensation. Himmelberg and
Hubbard (2000) is an early attempt to jointly model pay and incentives, but the level of pay
is not an equilibrium and the absence of closed-form solutions renders drawing implications
di¢ cult. Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) present
competitive assignment models of the managerial labor market, absent an agency problem.
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), Acharya and Volpin (2010), Axelson and Bond (2010),
Dicks (2010), Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2010) add moral hazard but assume risk-neutrality
and thus cannot investigate the e¤ect of risk, risk aversion or risk-taking.3 Adding risk aver-
sion is typically a non-trivial extension that leads to very complex contracts. Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987) derive simple contracts under the aforementioned assumptions of exponential
utility, a nancial cost of e¤ort, continuous time, and Gaussian noise. However, as shown by
Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009), a multiplicative non-nancial cost of e¤ort is necessary
to generate realistic income e¤ects and empirically consistent scalings of incentives with rm
size. We thus use the modeling setup of Edmans and Gabaix (2010, EG) which yields closed-
form contracts without restrictions on the utility function or cost of e¤ort, while retaining the
clarity of discrete time. As a result, the equilibrium can be summarized by three closed-form
equations. Plehn-Dujowich and Subrahmaniam (2010) and Tsuyuhara (2010) consider a market
equilibrium with risk aversion, where both rms and workers are ex ante homogeneous. Like us,
Baranchuk, Macdonald, and Yang (2010) and Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2010) allow
2In Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2009), workers (not rms) di¤er on multiple characteristics; the model species
that productivity is a weighted average of these characteristics, thus e¤ectively representing a single dimension.
Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) consider the allocation of workers to tasks, where both di¤er
along a single dimension (skill and complexity, respectively). Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979) study the allocation
of agents to jobs (either worker or entrepreneur) according to a single dimension, risk aversion. Galichon and
Salanie (2009) do consider matching where both parties vary according to multiple dimensions, but require
utility to be transferable across the matching parties and are unable to obtain closed-form solutions.
3de Bettignies and Chemla (2008) study the e¤ect of competition for the CEO among principals on the power
of incentives and the form of the contract. They consider a single manager.
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for heterogeneous managers in a market equilibrium with risk aversion, but assume linear con-
tracts in contrast to our optimal contracting approach. Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2010)
extend the standard assignment model to incorporate heterogeneity in corporate governance
and show the allocation depends on governance, as well as size.
1. The Model
1.1 Incentive pay in partial equilibrium
We commence with a one-period model featuring a single rm and a single CEO (also referred
to as the manager). This section is similar to EG; the main results come in Section 1.2 where
we extend the model to a market equilibrium with multiple rms and CEOs. The Appendix
provides proofs not given in the main text. The rms end-of-period stock price is given by:
P1 = se
a a+=E [e] , (1)
where s represents baseline rm size and a 2 [a; a] is the CEOs action (e¤ort). The action
a refers to any decision that improves the stock price but is costly to the manager, such as
exerting e¤ort, forgoing private benets, or choosing not to consume perks. Since there is a
limit to the number of productive activities the agent can undertake to benet the principal,
we specify the rms end-of-period fundamental value as:
V1 = se
min(a;a)+ a=E [e] : (2)
a is the maximum productive e¤ort level. For example, a reects zero stealing in a cash ow
diversion model, taking all positive-NPV projects (while rejecting negative-NPV ones) in a
project selection model, or a limit to the number of hours the CEO can work while remaining
productive in an e¤ort model. Actions a > a do not benet the principal but improve the
stock price, such as manipulation. We allow for the maximum feasible action a to exceed the
maximum productive action a purely for technical reasons when a is an interior action, the
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint to implement a becomes an equality, which substantially
simplies the proofs. Shareholders maximize expected fundamental value net of CEO pay. We
prove in the Appendix that, if rm size s is su¢ ciently high, maximum productive e¤ort a is
optimal for the rm because the benets of e¤ort (which are multiplicative in s) outweigh the
costs (disutility and ine¢ cient risk-sharing, which are multiplicative in the CEOs wage).4 We
assume that V1 is non-contractible and so CEO pay can only be made contingent on P1.
The variable  is mean-zero noise with standard deviation  and bounded interval support.
4Implementing a > a is inferior as it does not improve rm value but imposes greater disutility and risk on
the CEO.
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The normalization by E [e] in (1) and (2) ensures that expected rm value does not depend
on the noise distribution. The CEO privately observes  before choosing a. EG show that
this assumption leads to closed-form contracts in discrete time, as well as consistency with the
optimal contract in continuous-time, where noise and actions are simultaneous.5 Note that the
CEO remains exposed to risk, since he does not observe  until after signing the contract as
we will see, risk a¤ects virtually all of our results.
On the equilibrium path where a = a is exerted, the initial stock price is P0 = e E [P1],
where  is the continuously compounded discount rate. Thus, the rms log stock return is:
r = ln
P1
P0
= a+  + ; (3)
with  =    a  lnE [e].
The CEO has no pre-existing wealth, and his utility is given by:
U (c; a) =
 
ce g(a)
1  
1    for   6= 1 (4)
= ln c  g (a) for   = 1:
c is the CEOs monetary compensation. g (a) captures the disutility of e¤ort and is increasing
and convex; in Section 1.2 we allow the cost function g () to depend on the rm that the CEO
is working for, i.e., it is a rm rather than CEO characteristic.6    0 denotes relative risk
aversion. The CEOs reservation utility is u, which is exogenous in this section.
As in Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), e¤ort has a multiplicative e¤ect on both CEO
utility (equation (4)) and rm value (equation (2)). When e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on rm
value, the dollar benets of working are higher for larger rms. Most CEO actions can be rolled
outacross the entire rm and thus have a greater e¤ect in a larger company. Multiplicative
preferences consider private benets as a normal good, i.e., the utility they provide is increasing
in consumption. This is consistent with the treatment of most goods and services in consumer
theory; they are also commonly used in macroeconomics (e.g., Cooley and Prescott 1995). This
specication is also plausible under the literal interpretation of e¤ort as forgoing leisure: a day
of vacation is more valuable to a richer CEO as he has wealth to enjoy during it. Thus, the
CEOs expenditure on leisure and private benets rises in proportion to his wealth just as
5This timing assumption is also featured in models in which the agent sees total output before deciding how
much to divert (e.g. Lacker and Weinberg 1989; DeMarzo and Fishman 2007; Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and
Rochet 2007), or observes the state of naturebefore choosing e¤ort (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1979; Sappington
1983; Baker 1992; and Prendergast 2002). As in most of these papers, to focus on a single source of imperfection
(unobservability of e¤ort) we abstract from commitment problems and assume that the CEO cannot quit after
 is realized. Quits can be prevented by raising the xed component of pay (see Appendix F of EG.)
6More formally, the utility function is (
ce G)
1  
1   , where G is the disutility that working in the rm imposes
on the CEO. Exerting e¤ort a in rm n entails disutility G = gn (a), where gn is a function denoting the cost
of e¤ort from working in rm n.
8
with CRRA preferences, an investors allocation to risky assets rises in proportion to his wealth.
Indeed, it is multiplicative preferences that generate the CRRA utility function (4).7 Thus, just
as CRRA is typically favored over CARA in asset pricing and macroeconomics because it leads
to realistic income e¤ects, the same considerations motivate the use of a multiplicative rather
than nancial cost of e¤ort here. In addition, Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) show
that multiplicative preferences and production functions are necessary to deliver empirically
consistent predictions for the scaling of various incentive measures with rm size.
We take an optimal contracting approach that does not restrict the contract to specic
functional forms.8 The optimal contract is a general function c (r) that implements a = a,
satises the participation constraint E [U ]  u, and has the minimum cost w = E[c] to the
rm. From Theorem 1 of EG, the optimal contract is as follows:
Proposition 1 (CEO Pay in Partial Equilibrium) The optimal contract pays the CEO
an amount c dened by9:
ln c = r +K; (5)
where  = g0 (a) and K is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind
(E
h 
ce g(a)
1  
= (1   )
i
= u).
Proof The full proof is in EG; a heuristic proof is in The Appendix.
The contract in Proposition 1 has a simple form. It is attainable in closed form, and its
slope depends only on the cost of e¤ort , but not on risk  nor risk aversion   these only
a¤ect the scalar K. The sensitivity  represents the percentage change in pay c for a given
return r. The contract can thus be implemented by giving the CEO w of stock and (1  )w
of cash.10 When considering the contract in terms of the e¤ect of rm returns on dollar pay,
 reects the convexity of the contract. Thus, changes in  a¤ect both the sensitivity of the
contract (in percent terms) and its convexity (in dollar terms).
We parameterize  = ", where " has unit variance, and dene
 
 
2

= 2

lnE [e"]  1
1    lnE

e(1  )"

:
7Consider the general utility function U (c; a) = e
(1  )(v(c) g(a))
1   . Our utility function (4) is a special case of this
with v (c) = ln c (multiplicative preferences), which leads to CRRA. By contrast, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
assume that the cost of e¤ort is nancial, i.e., v (c) = c and so the utility function becomes e(1  )(c g(a))= (1   ),
which is CARA.
8Even though this is a hidden information model (the CEO learns  before choosing a), the optimal contract
does not involve messages, as proven in EG. Intuitively, the rm wishes to implement a for all . Thus, on the
equilibrium path, there is a one-to-one correspondence between r and , which makes messages redundant.
9Our contract is written for r in the domain observed in the equibrium path, i.e., for the domain observed
conditional on a = a . For values (not observed in equilibrium) outside of that domain, the contract pays a very
low consumption (c! 0) to the agent.
10Since r is a continuously compounded return, the contract must be rebalanced continuously so that the
percentage of stock remains constant at .
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If " is a standard Gaussian, then
 
 
2

=  2
while for any distribution with nite expectations, we have
 
 
2
   2
for  ! 0.   (22) =2 is the risk premium required by a CEO receiving the contract in
Proposition 1, in the sense that   (22) =2 = lnE [c]  lnU 1 (E [U (c)]), where U (c) = c(1  )
1   .
This interpretation motivates our notation  .
1.2 Incentive pay in market equilibrium
The simplicity of the contract in Proposition 1 allows it to be embedded into a market equilib-
rium where the expected wage w is endogenously determined. We use the equilibrium model
of GL, which we summarize here. There is a continuum of rms of di¤erent size and managers
with di¤erent talent. Firm n 2 [0; N ] has size S (n) and CEO m 2 [0; N ] has talent T (m). Low
n denotes a larger rm and low m a more talented CEO: S 0 (n) < 0, T 0 (m) < 0. The CEOs
talent increases rm value according to:
s = S + CTS; (6)
where  parameterizes the size elasticity of the impact of talent and C the productivity of
talent, which we later allow to be heterogeneous across rms. Since talented CEOs are more
valuable in larger rms, the nth most talented manager is matched with the nth largest rm to
allow their talent to have greatest impact. The variable s considered in Section 1.1 thus refers
to rm size gross of talent and S refers to net size; going forward, unless otherwise stated, the
term sizewill refer to S.
GL assume a Pareto rm size distribution S (n) = An , and the following asymptotic value
for the spacings of the talent distribution: T 0 (n) =  Bn 1. As in GL, we consider the limit
as n=N ! 0, i.e., the upper tail of the pay distribution. The equilibrium expected pay is:
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (7)
where S (n) is the size of rm n, n is the index of a reference rm (e.g., the median rm in
the economy), S (n) is the size of that reference rm, and D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is
a constant. CEOs at large rms earn more as they are the most talented.
GL do not feature an agency problem and only specify the expected level of pay. We now
incorporate the incentive model of Section 1.1 to determine the sensitivity of pay. We index the
maximum e¤ort level by an to allow for heterogeneity in the level of e¤ort required. Firms may
also di¤er in their cost of e¤ort, gn (an) (e.g., a rm in a regulated industry or headquartered
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in an unattractive location is unpleasant to work for regardless of the e¤ort a exerted by the
CEO). The marginal cost of e¤ort at the implemented e¤ort level becomes n = g0n (an). Risk
may also vary and is indexed n. We need not make any assumptions on how these parameters
vary with n: since the contract implements a = an, from (2), gross rm value remains at s as
in the GL market equilibrium.
The expected utility of rm ns CEO is given by:
Un =
(wne
 n)1  
1    ;
where:
n = gn (an) +
  (2n
2
n)
2
(8)
denotes the equivalent variation(EV) associated with rm n, i.e., the loss su¤ered by the
manager from disutility (the gn (an) term) and risk (the   (2n
2
n) =2 term). The latter arises
because the CEO has a fraction n of his pay invested in the rm, and rm returns have
volatility n. After adjusting for the EV, CEO ns e¤ectivewage is:
vn = wne
 n : (9)
Dene  as the average of the rmsEVs:
e  = E

e n=()

: (10)
CEO assignment, pay, and incentives in market equilibrium are given below:
Theorem 1 (CEO Pay in Market Equilibrium) Rank managers by their talent Tn and
rms by their e¤ective sizedened by:
bSn = Sne n=. (11)
In equilibrium, the manager of rank n runs a rm whose e¤ective size is ranked n, and receives
an expected pay:
wn = D (n)S(n)=S =n exp



(n   )

; (12)
where n and  are dened by (8) and (10), S(n) is the size of the reference rm, and D (n)
is a constant independent of rm size. The actual pay cn is given by:
ln cn = nrn + lnwn   lnE

enrn

: (13)
Proof (Sketch). Assume that in market equilibrium, a CEO of talent T (m) receives an e¤ective
wage (adjusted for e¤ort and risk) of v (m). If rm n wishes to hire manager m, it must pay
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him a e¤ective wage v (m) and thus a dollar wage v (m) en. It solves:
max
m
E

(S (n) + CS (n) T (m))
e
E [e]
  v (m) en

i.e.
max
m
Ce nS (n) T (m)  v (m) : (14)
Firm n behaves like a rm with e¤ectivesize (e n)1= S (n). The Appendix proves that it
will pay the e¤ective wage vn = D (n) (e S(n))
=  
e n=S
 =
. Taking into account the
EV, the dollar wage is wn = vnen, which yields (12); (13) ows directly from Proposition 1.
Theorem 1 shows that CEO assignment, pay, and incentives in competitive market equi-
librium can be summarized by three simple closed-form equations, (11)-(13). This tractability
allows for clear comparative statics. Starting with managerial assignment, in standard models,
rms and CEOs each vary along a single dimension (size and talent, respectively). This al-
lows for a relatively simple solution to the assignment problem positive assortative matching,
where the CEO with the highest attribute is matched to the rm with the highest attribute.
Assignment models are typically di¢ cult to solve where there is rm heterogeneity along multi-
ple dimensions, since it is unclear how to rank the rms and determine which is the bestrm
to be matched with the most talented CEO. The above proof sketch shows that risk n and
the marginal cost of e¤ort n can be combined with size Sn into a single dimension, e¤ective
size Sne n=, which can be unambiguously ranked and determines the equilibrium matching.
In assignment models without moral hazard, more talented managers are assigned to larger
rms; this is e¢ cient because talent has a greater impact in a bigger rm. We show that adding
an agency problem distorts this e¢ cient allocation. A rm with a higher cost of e¤ort must pay
a greater salary to compensate. Given multiplicative preferences, exerting e¤ort is particularly
costly for talented, highly-paid CEOs. For example, a day of vacation yields high utility to a
rich CEO as he has income to spend during it. Therefore, the compensation for disutility is
proportional to the CEOs wage. The required compensation for risk is also proportional to the
CEOs wage. The incentive contract (13) pins down the fraction n of the CEOs salary that
must be paid in stock. CEOs that are already wealthy are less motivated by incentives, and thus
must be given a greater dollar amount of stock to induce e¤ort. Therefore, an increase in rm
risk has a greater dollar e¤ect on the variability of their pay, and requires the rm to pay them
a higher dollar risk premium.11 With multiplicative preferences, the CEOs dollar stock holding
is a percentage of his wage. Combined with CRRA, this means that the required risk premium
is also a percentage of the wage. In sum, both disutility and risk force a rm to increase the
11Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2010) nd that managers with steeper contracts are paid more, and
Conyon, Core, and Guay (2010) shows that the higher salary of U.S. CEOs compared to their U.K. counterparts
can be explained by the fact that the former hold greater equity incentives, and thus require compensation for
risk.
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salary of any manager that it hires by a given proportional amount, en. Since this additional
compensation is proportional to the CEOs salary, it is higher for more talented managers
and so skilled managers become relatively more expensive. Therefore, the rm chooses to hire
a lower ability manager. Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2010) nd that rms with weaker
governance employ high-talent managers. This is consistent with the model as tightly-governed
rms impose constraints on the CEO and so are less attractive to work for. The prediction is
also shared by the model of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), in which skilled CEOs bargain for
weaker governance as it imposes disutility on them. Similarly, Palia (2000) shows that rms in
regulated industries hire lower-quality CEOs.
In sum, managerial talent is a double-edged sword. While a talented manager has the
potential to improve rm value to a greater degree, he is also more expensive to incentivize: since
he already commands a high salary, he is willing to forgo incentive pay to enjoy leisure. Indeed,
Malmendier and Tate (2009) nd that winning awards (which may lead to an upward revision
of the markets perception of the CEOs talent) leads to CEOs pursuing outside opportunities,
such as writing books and assuming board seats. Falato, Li, andMilbourn (2010) document that
more talented CEOs, who are more di¢ cult to incentivize through pay, are instead disciplined
through greater turnover-performance sensitivity. The incentive problem is particularly severe
if the rm involves high e¤ort or risk. Thus, start-ups in particular may prefer to hire a
poor-and-hungryCEO rather than a rich-and-contentedalternative.
Turning to expected pay, (12) shows that the wage depends not only on rm size Sn as in
GL, but also on how the rms cost of e¤ort and risk (n) compare to other rms in the economy
(). Thus, CEOs are not paid only for their talent, but also to compensate for bearing risk
and disutility. Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) use sudden deaths to identify managerial ability and
show that, while there is generally a positive correlation between talent and salary, a signicant
number of low-ability managers are well paid. Holding  constant, an increase in n augments
the wage as a recompense for risk and disutility. Therefore, in the cross-section, rms with high
EVs pay more. Indeed, Garen (1994) nds empirically that CEOs of riskier rms command
higher pay. Note that there are two e¤ects of risk on pay on the one hand, it causes a rm
to hire a less talented and thus cheaper manager (from (11)); on the other hand, it must pay
the manager more. Equation (12) takes both e¤ects into account. If a rms cost of e¤ort
and risk rose from  to n and the rm did not change its manager, its pay would rise by
exp (n   ). However, since the rm will trade down to a less talented manager, it rises by
only exp



(n   )

.
Note that it is only the relative EV, (n   ), that matters. Thus, disutility and risk only
matter in the cross-section but not in the aggregate. If there was an economy-wide increase in
risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g., due to regulation or activist shareholders), which
increases the EV of all rms by the same absolute amount , both n and  increase by ;
(n   ) and thus wages are una¤ected even though working for ones present rm becomes
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less attractive, so do the outside options.12 Regarding the own-rm prediction, Peters and
Wagner (2009) nd that a one percentage point increase in the risk of ring augments pay by
4%-8% along the cross-section, but only 0.2%-1.3% over the time series. Peters (2009) shows
that risk can explain the higher moments of the cross-sectional pay distribution. Regarding the
cross-rm prediction, Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2010) nd that a rm pays higher salaries
if its competitors are worse governed (and thus more attractive to work for). More generally,
the dependence of pay on the aggregate variable  highlights the importance of controlling for
economy-wide variables such as average risk (or at least time trends) in empirical analyses of
the determinants of pay.
The e¤ect of changes in (n   ) on expected pay is scaled by =. A higher  raises the
dispersion of rm sizes, and a higher  augments the size elasticity of talent.13 Both factors
increase the importance of size for CEO assignment and pay, and mean that variations in n are
relatively unimportant as can be seen in (11), the e¤ect of n on e¤ectivesize is decreasing
in . Hence  and  appear in the denominator of (12). By contrast, a higher  raises the
dispersion of CEO talent. When talent is more variable, rms are more willing to pay the
required compensation to attract a talented CEO (rather than trading downto the next best
CEO), and so (n   ) has a higher e¤ect on the wage.
Moving to the strength of incentives, (13) shows that it depends only on n, the cost of
e¤ort, and is independent of risk and risk aversion. Hence, Theorem 1 shows which parameters
do and do not matter for the di¤erent components of the contract. The cost of e¤ort a¤ects the
strength of incentives and the level of pay in the cross-section but not in the aggregate. Risk
and risk aversion also augment the level of pay in the cross-section, but not in the aggregate.
However, they have no e¤ect on the strength of incentives. The familiar trade-o¤ between
incentives and risk, predicted by standard contracting models, may not apply to CEOs. Since
CEOs impact the entire rm, if the rm is su¢ ciently large, the benets of e¤ort are su¢ ciently
strong that the rm implements maximum e¤ort regardless of risk or risk aversion.
Theorem 1 can be extended to allow for rm heterogeneity not only in total disutility an and
risk n, but also the impact of CEO talent. This extension is given in the following Remark.
Remark 1 (Heterogeneous Talent Impact) Let the e¤ect of talent on rm value (6) be
given by:
sn = Sn + CnTS

n; (15)
where Cn parameterizes the productivity of talent in rm n. In equilibrium, the manager of
12This prediction assumes that a CEOs only outside option is to become a CEO of another rm. If CEOs
can nd a job outside of the CEO market (as considered in Section 2.2), the more general prediction is that the
cross-sectional elasticity of the wage to disutility and risk is higher than the market-wide elasticity.
13In mathematical terms, it is S that matters for assignment, given equation (6). In turn, S (n) = An  :
S has a Pareto distribution with exponent 1= (). The higher  is, the more dispersed the distribution of
elasticity-adjusted sizes S .
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rank n runs a rm whose e¤ective size
bbSn = SnC1 n e n=
is ranked n.
A rm with high Cn particularly benets from a talented manager and thus has a higher
e¤ective size. For example, rms with high growth opportunities or in an unregulated industry
have signicant scope for a talented manager to add value.14 Note also that talent impact Cn is
a quite di¤erent concept from disutility gn (an), and so the di¤erential e¤ects of these variables
on the talent of the CEO hired are mutually consistent. gn (an) reects the total disutility the
CEO must su¤er when working for the rm (e.g., from regulation, being headquartered in an
unfavorable location, or having to exert e¤ort or forgo vacation days). These are inconveniences
that are not mitigated by talent; in fact, they are particularly severe for talented managers
owing to multiplicative preferences. By contrast, Cn reects the impact that a talented CEO
has on rm value if he exerts maximum e¤ort: recall that gross rm value s only becomes (15) if
an = an, so it is Cn not an that parameterizes the maximum potential value.15 Thus, Cn reects
the potential for the manager to add value through exploiting growth opportunities, innovating
or changing strategy. We previously noted that Palia (2000) nds that regulated rms hire
low-talented managers, which is consistent with the disutility caused by regulation. Remark 1
provides an additional reason for this result: regulated rms have lower talent-sensitivity Cn,
since regulation limits the actions a talented manager can undertake to increase rm value.
In sum, Remark 1 predicts that talented managers will be hired by rms with high growth
potential, low risk, and low disutility.
One might also think that talent might a¤ect the CEOs productivity of e¤ort, in addition
to its e¤ect on maximum rm value as measured by T . Unfortunately, it is very di¢ cult to solve
tractably an assignment model in which both sides di¤er along multiple dimensions; while we are
able to go beyond prior literature by allowing for rm heterogeneity across multiple dimensions,
CEOs can only di¤er along a single dimension (the parameter T ) and so we cannot introduce a
separate manager-specic parameter for the productivity of e¤ort. However, note that T already
captures the productivity of e¤ort to a degree: since V1n = (Sn + CnTSn) e
min(a;a)+ a=E [e],
the marginal e¤ect of increasing a on rm value is increasing in T . Hence, our single source
of manager heterogeneity does incorporate the realistic notion that e¤ort is more productive if
the manager is talented.16
14Since growing rms are also likely to be risky, and risk reduces the talent of the CEO hired from Theorem
1, empirical testing of this prediction will have to control for risk.
15From equation (2), we have E [V1] = semin(a;a) a and so a denotes the range of actions the CEO can take
to destroy rm value (compared to the maximum e¤ort benchmark) rather than create value. For example, an
is high in rms with free cash ow problems or weak governance.
16Even though e¤ort has a higher dollar productivity for a talented manager, its percentage productivity (i.e.,
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We conclude this section by highlighting the features in the model that generate our re-
sults. First, the positive qualitative relationship between the CEOs wage and the required
compensation for disutility and risk, and thus distortions in allocation, can be generated by
other utility functions and do not require multiplicative preferences. (See the Appendix for
a proof.) Multiplicative preferences are only necessary to deliver the quantitative result that,
as the CEOs wage rises, his dollar stock holdings must increase in direct proportion. Thus,
if n is constant across rms, the fraction of pay that is in stock is independent across rms
of di¤erent size, as found empirically by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Murphy (1999).
This empirical consistency is not a new result Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) already
showed that multiplicative preferences are necessary to generate the size-independence of the
stock fraction (albeit in a risk-neutral model) instead, it provides the justication for using
multiplicative preferences here. In turn, the direct proportionality (that results from multi-
plicative preferences and CRRA) leads to substantial tractability, as it means that many key
variables scale with CEO pay. In particular, the required compensation for risk and disutility
is proportional to the wage, so the e¤ective wage is proportional to the actual wage. This is
critical for the derivation of the e¤ectivesize variable bSn that allows a tractable solution to
a multidimensional allocation problem (see the proof sketch of Theorem 1).
Second, in standard models, the optimal e¤ort level for the rm is a trade-o¤ between the
costs (disutility plus the risk imposed by incentives) and benets of e¤ort, and is typically very
di¢ cult to solve (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart 1983). Since CEOs can a¤ect the entire rm
value, the benets of e¤ort outweigh the costs and so the rm always implements maximum
e¤ort. This removes the need to analyze small trade-o¤s and leads to a simple optimal contract.
Third, the CEO observes the noise before taking his action. As shown in the heuristic proof
and in EG, this leads to simple contracts such as (5). The intuition is that, since the CEO has
observed  when taking his action, the IC condition ((33) in The Appendix) must hold state-
by-state (i.e., for every possible realization of ). This tightly constrains the set of contracts
available to the principal. If  was realized after a, the IC condition would only need to hold
on average. Many contracts would satisfy the IC condition, and the problem becomes complex
as the principal must solve for the cheapest contract out of this continuum.
1.3 E¢ ciency analysis
1.3.1 Losses from moral hazard under optimal contracting
In a pure assignment model, the e¢ cient allocation involves positive assortative matching be-
tween talent and size. With an e¤ort decision, the rst-best allocation (that would occur if
e¤ort was observable) now involves assigning CEOs to rms based on their size and disutility.
the e¤ect of e¤ort on rm returns) is independent of talent, and so the incentive contract (13) is independent
of T . Intuitively, since the market already knows that the manager is talented, the rms stock price is already
high; thus, to increase the stock return, he has to work just as hard as an untalented manager.
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It may be e¢ cient for a talented CEO not to work for a large rm if it involves high disu-
tility, because working is particularly painful for wealthy CEOs. If all CEOs are risk-neutral,
then e¤ective sizebecomes Sne gn(an)= and is based on size and disutility alone, and so the
market equilibrium allocation is rst-best e¢ cient, just as in the risk-neutral model of Edmans
et al. (2009). Thus, the addition of an e¤ort decision without risk aversion does not lead to
distortions: analogously, in a standard e¤ort model, the rst-best can be achieved if the agent
is risk-neutral and does not face limited liability.
However, when risk aversion is added, the market allocation now depends on risk aversion,
as well as size and disutility, and is second-best. Large rms that would benet highly from
a talented CEO nevertheless choose to hire a lower-ability CEO if they are risky. Thus, risk
aversion leads to two sources of ine¢ ciency. The rst is ine¢ cient risk-sharing between rms
and CEOs, which also exists in a single-rm moral hazard model and does not a¤ect production.
The second, which is specic to a market equilibrium, is distortions in talent assignment that
a¤ect real productive activity.
We now derive closed-form expressions for both sources of ine¢ ciency to analyze the cost
of the moral hazard problem, even when it is fully solved by contracts. If corporate governance
were perfect, boards would monitor the managers actions directly, achieving rst-best. Given
imperfect monitoring, moral hazard must be addressed with incentive pay. Even if such con-
tracts are set optimally, the above ine¢ ciencies remain. Direct monitoring and incentives are
sometimes seen as substitute governance mechanisms; however, the former is more e¢ cient as
it does not lead to distortions.
Since ine¢ ciency stems solely from risk, not disutility, for simplicity we set gn (an) = 0 8 n.
The EV thus becomes 0n =   (
2
n
2
n) =2; its mean 
0 is dened analogously using (10). Let
W =
Z
w (n) dn (16)
denote the total salary received by CEOs, and normalize the wage of the least talented manager,
w (N), to 0. Since a wage of w is worth an e¤ectivewage of we 
0
n, the total loss due to
ine¢ cient risk-sharing is:
LRA =
Z h
w (n)  w (n) e 0n
i
dn:
If bT (n) denotes the talent of the CEO assigned to rm n under the second-best allocation, the
loss due to ine¢ cient talent assignment is given by:
LAlloc =
Z
CS (n) T (n) dn 
Z
CS (n) bT (n) dn:
The losses are given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Losses from Moral Hazard under Optimal Contracting) The loss due
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to ine¢ cient risk-sharing is:
LRA = E
h
1  e 0n
i
W (17)
and the loss due to ine¢ cient talent assignment is:
LAlloc =
1

E
h
e


(0n 0)   1
i
W: (18)
For small distortions, these expressions become:
LRA  E [0n]W (19)
LAlloc  1 + 
222
var (0n)W: (20)
Proof See the Appendix.
Both sources of ine¢ ciency are proportional toW , the total wage bill. This is intuitive: the
economic importance of a distortion to a factor of production is proportional to its marginal
product; for a worker this is measured by his wage. From (19), the approximate loss due to
ine¢ cient risk-sharing depends on the mean of 0n, since this a¤ects the amount of risk the
average CEO has to bear. By contrast, from (20), the approximate loss due to misallocation is
proportional to the variance of 0n. If 
0
n = 
0, the rankings of e¤ective size Sne 
0
n= coincide
exactly with the rankings of size S and there is no distortion. It is relative di¤erences in 0n
that cause the rankings to di¤er and the assignment to be a¤ected.
Holding W constant, , , and  have the same e¤ects on allocational e¢ ciency LAlloc as
they do for the dispersion of wages in (12). The intuition is similar: when  and  are high,
distortions due to di¤erences in 0n have a small e¤ect. The ranking of e¤ective size is similar
to the ranking of unadjusted size and so assignment is little a¤ected. By contrast, a higher 
means that talent is more dispersed, and so the losses from misallocation of talent are greater.
Section 2.3 calibrates the magnitude of these losses. Note that we can already draw some
conclusions from the analytical expressions in Proposition 2: the ine¢ ciencies will be moderate
as they are proportional to the total wage billW rather than rm size. This is because rms are
contracting e¢ ciently and making optimal hiring decisions, given the need to pay a premium for
risk and disutility. Indeed, the allocation is second-best e¢ cient: given the existence of a moral
hazard problem (the unobservability of e¤ort), a social planner who has the same information
as rms (and is thus also unable to observe e¤ort) could not improve on the outcome. A formal
proof is in The Appendix.
1.3.2 Losses from random assignment
For comparison with the above moderate losses, we now conduct the following thought exper-
iment. Assume that poor corporate governance instead manifests in CEOs being randomly
allocated, rather than a second-best optimal assignment, i.e., in addition to being unable to
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monitor, boards make errors in hiring. Each rm in the top N by size hires a CEO at random
from the topMN CEOs by talent, whereM  1 is a parameter we discuss below. The e¢ ciency
loss is
LRand =
Z
CS (n) T (n) 
Z
CS (n) Tdn;
where T = 1
MN
RMN
0
T (n) dn denotes the mean talent.
Proposition 3 (Losses from Random Assignment) If  > 1, the losses from a random
allocation of CEOs are innite, LRand = +1. If  < 1;
LRand =

1   + 
(1 + ) (1  )M
   1

W

: (21)
For M = 1, this specializes to:
LRand =

(1  ) (1 + )W: (22)
Proof See the Appendix.
Equation (20) showed that losses due to misallocation of talent resulting from moral hazard
are decreasing in  and  (holding W constant). By contrast, the losses due to random assign-
ment are increasing in  and . In Proposition 2, assignment is second-best optimal. Thus,
when e¤ective rm size is more dispersed ( and  are higher), variation in n has a relatively
small e¤ect on the rankings of e¤ective rm size and we remain close to positive assortative
matching. The losses from second-best matching are thus lower. In Proposition 3, assignment
is random. Thus, when e¤ective rm size is more dispersed, the losses from random matching
are higher. Since talent has a multiplicative e¤ect on scaled rm size S (equation (6)), the
cost of random assignment of talent is a function of scaled rm size. When  > 1, this mean
rm size E [S] is innite and so losses are innite.
There are two natural choices for M . One is M = 1, i.e., the top N rms randomly choose
from the top N CEOs, in which case the losses are given by (22). However, this is not an equal
comparison with the losses from second-best assignment given in Proposition 2. With M = 1,
all rms are guaranteed a CEO in the top N . By contrast, in the allocation of Proposition 2,
a rm of size rank N hires a CEO of talent rank Nen . Therefore, the worst manager that
can be hired has rank MN , where:
M = sup en . (23)
Thus, a second natural choice for M in Proposition 3 is given by (23), in which case the worst
manager that can be hired also has rank N sup en , just as in Proposition 2. With this choice
of M , the losses under random and second-best allocation can be directly compared. Since
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1 < 1 +
(1+)(1 ) , we have:
LAlloc = E
h
e


(0n 0)   1
iW

  M   1W

=

1   + 
(1 + ) (1  )M
   1

W

= LRand.
Thus, LAlloc  LRand as is intuitive: second-best matching is superior to random matching.
The di¤erence is increasing in  and , as these variables raise the dispersion of e¤ective rm
size and thus importance of second-best matching.
Recent criticism of corporate governance has centered around ine¢ ciencies in pay-setting
(e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004). The results of Section 1.3 show that, even if boards are able to
set optimal contracts that are fully e¤ective at preventing the CEO from shirking and consuming
perks, there may be signicant value losses. Section 1.3.1 shows that, if boards are unable to
monitor and must use contracts to solve agency problems, there can be non-trivial losses, even
if their hiring decisions are second-best optimal. Section 1.3.2 shows that the losses are even
greater if inability to monitor is compounded by errors in hiring.
2. Extensions
2.1 Providing risk-taking incentives
2.1.1 General theorem
In the core model, the CEO can improve the mean return r without changing risk, which is
exogenous at . In reality, increasing rm value may require taking on risky, positive-NPV
projects. Indeed, many commentators argue that a major goal of incentive compensation is
to induce managers to take actions that improve rm value even if they augment risk (see,
e.g., Core, Guay and Larcker 2003). In this section, we endogenize risk so that it depends on
the mean return chosen by the CEO. In a standard model with e¤ort and risk-taking where
noise follows the action (e.g., Dittmann and Yu 2010), the above choice can be modeled by
allowing the CEO to choose a single action a, which a¤ects both the mean and volatility of the
return. Since the action a¤ects the distribution of the noise, the noise must follow the action.
However, the framework we use to achieve tractability requires no noise to follow the CEOs
nal action, so that the IC constraints hold state-by-state. We therefore operationalize the
CEOs risk choice by extending the model to two periods. The rst-period action a1 a¤ects
both the mean of the rst-period signal r1 and the volatility of the second-period signal r2.
(In this subsection, subscripts index time periods rather than the rank of a rm or CEO.) The
second-period action a2 a¤ects the mean of r2 only, since there is no noise to follow this action.
As with earlier, we solve for the cheapest contract that implements a in each period. We
20
conjecture that a1 = a remains optimal in the two-period model if the rm is su¢ ciently large
and so the benets of e¤ort outweigh the costs. Given the high complexity of proving the
optimality of maximum e¤ort in a multi-period context (see Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and
Sannikov 2010), we do not attempt a formal proof here.
The full timing is as follows:
1. Noise 1 is privately observed by the CEO.
2. The CEO chooses a1:
3. The signal r1 = a1 + 1 is publicly observed.
4. Noise 2 is privately observed by the CEO.
5. The CEO chooses a2:
6. The signal r2 = a2 +  (a1) 2 +  (a1) is publicly observed.
While r2 depends directly on a1, the support of 2 does not depend on a1. We have 0 (a1) 
0, so that actions to improve rm value also entail augmenting risk (e.g., taking on risky,
positive-NPV projects). To ensure that E [er2 j a1] is independent of a1 (so that a1 a¤ects the
volatility of rm value proportionally to ea1), we assume E [2] = 0 and take:
 (a1) =   lnE

e(a1)2

: (24)
To our knowledge, the contracting problem where the agent a¤ects the volatility as well as
the mean has only been solved in specic cases. Sung (1995) and Ou-Yang (2003) study the
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) case of exponential utility, a nancial cost of e¤ort, continuous
time, and Gaussian noise, and Dittmann and Yu (2010) consider separable preferences and
Gaussian noise in a one-period model.17 Therefore, before specializing to the utility function
(4) used in this paper, we rst derive the result for the more general utility function:
U (c; a1; a2) = u [(v (c)  g1 (a1)  g2 (a2))] ; (25)
where u (x) = e(1  )x= (1   ) for   6= 1 and u (x) = x for   = 1. The only assumption we
make on v is that it is increasing and weakly concave. The utility function (4) corresponds to
v (c) = ln c and a single action.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Contract, Endogenous Risk) The optimal contract pays the CEO
an amount c dened by:
c (r1; r2) = v
 1 (1r1 + 2r2 +K) (26)
17Lambert (1986) considers a model in which the agent takes separate e¤ort and volatility decisions, in a
model where output is restricted to three possible levels.
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with
1 =
(
g01 (a)  20 (a)  11   dda1 lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2)

a1=a
if   6= 1
g01 (a)  20 (a) if   = 1;
(27)
2 = g
0
2 (a) , (28)
and K is a constant that makes the CEOs participation constraint bind.
For the particular case where 2 is Gaussian, or the limit of small noises, then 0 (a) =
  (a)0 (a), and so
1 = g
0
1 (a) +

2 + (   1) (2)2

 (a)0 (a) : (29)
Proof See the Appendix.
2.1.2 Application to CRRA preferences
The utility function (4) corresponds to v (c) = ln c. Applying Theorem 2 to this case yields the
following result.
Proposition 4 (CEO pay in Partial Equilibrium, Endogenous Risk) The optimal con-
tract pays the CEO an amount c dened by:
ln c = 1r1 + 2r2 +K;
where 1 and 2 are given by (27) and (28). On the equilibrium path this can be rewritten:
ln c = k + ,
where k is a constant that makes the CEOs participation constraint bind, and
 = 11 + 2 (a) 2 (30)
is the total noise to which the contract exposes the agent.
The market equilibrium allocation and wage are given by equations (11) and (12) in Theorem
1, with the EV now dened by
n = g1n (an) + g2n (an) +
  (n)
2
;
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where n indexes rm ns risk and cost of e¤ort, n = n1n1 + n2 (an) n2, and we dene
(with a slight abuse of notation):
  (n) = 2

lnE [en ]  1
1    lnE

e(1  )n

:
Proposition 1 shows that, under exogenous risk, 1 = g01 (a). We compare this with our
slope under endogenous risk with small or Gaussian noises, equation (29). The core case is
   1. 1 is higher when the CEO a¤ects rm risk, since the contract must now induce not
only e¤ort but also risk-taking. A risk-averse CEO may forgo risky, positive-NPV projects. To
induce him to accept such a project, it is necessary to give him a more convex payout so that
he benets from risk. Since the strength of incentives 1 also represents the convexity of dollar
pay to rm value, this increased convexity is achieved by raising 1. Indeed, Gormley, Matsa,
and Milbourn (2010) use a natural experiment to identify a positive causal impact of convexity
on risk-taking.
The strength of incentives 1 is increasing in four parameters. First, it is increasing in risk
aversion  : the more risk-averse the CEO, the greater the convexity needed to overcome his risk
aversion. For similar reasons, it is increasing in  (a) (the level of rm risk) and 2 (the CEOs
exposure to the risk induced by a1.) The positive relationship between incentives and risk  (a)
contrasts the negative association predicted by standard models, which assume exogenous risk
and posit a trade-o¤ between incentives and risk-sharing, but is consistent with the empirical
ndings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2004) and
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). Finally, 1 rises in the marginal increase in risk caused
by implementing all positive-NPV projects 0 (a). The intuition is similar: the greater the risk
imposed by a positive-NPV project, the greater the convexity the CEO must be given to induce
him to take it. If the main way in which the CEO a¤ects rm value is by not diverting cash
ows, there is no link between risk and return and so 0 (a) = 0 and 1 = g01 (a). By contrast,
if the key CEO action is the choice of risky projects, 0 (a) > 0 and 1 increases. 0 (a) is likely
to be high in new economy rms since they have little tangible capital and so enhancing rm
value involves greater risk investing in R&D has a zero payo¤ if it fails, whereas investing in
an old economy plant generates liquidation value upon failure. Indeed, incentives are stronger
in new economy rms (Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker 2003; Murphy 2003) and have risen over
time (Jensen and Murphy 2004). Guay (1999) nds that incentives are more convex in rms
with valuable risk-increasing projects.
An interesting benchmark case is that of a risk-neutral CEO. Plugging   = 0 into (29) gives
1 = g
0
1 (a) +

2   22

 (a)0 (a) ;
which is lower than g01 (a) if and only if 2 > 1. A risk-neutral CEO only cares about the
expected value of his compensation. If 2 > 1, then his compensation is a convex function of
23
the rms market value18, and thus he has incentives to take excessive risk (i.e., choose an a1
above the maximum productive level a). A lower 1 o¤sets this tendency and induces the CEO
to reduce a1 to the optimal level. In sum, our results contrast the argument (often made by
critics of executive pay) that powerful incentives induce the CEO to take excessive risk, and
thus if the CEO is able to a¤ect risk as well as the average return, incentives should be weaker.
For the core case of    1, incentives are unambiguously stronger; only if   is su¢ ciently low
and 2 is su¢ ciently high will incentives be shallower.
We note two additional points. First, even if g1 (a) = 0 8 a (i.e., the risk-increasing action is
costless to the CEO), 1 is non-zero incentives are necessary not because the e¢ cient action
requires the CEO to exert e¤ort, but because it exposes him to risk. This is consistent with
the idea mentioned at the start of this section, that incentives are used to induce risk-taking,
rather than solely to induce e¤ort. Second, since a1 a¤ects r2 (= a2+ (a1) 2+ (a1)), it may
seem that 2 could be used to control the CEOs choice of a1. However, 2 is unchanged at
g02 (a). This is because the time-2 IC condition must hold state-by-state (i.e., for every possible
realization of 2). In turn, this forces the slope of the contract (i.e., benets from e¤ort) to
equal the marginal cost of e¤ort, g02 (a). This is a similar intuition to the contracts tractability,
described at the end of Section 1.2  since the IC conditions must hold state-by-state, the
principal has little freedom in designing the contract.
2.2 Outside options
The core model considered a single labor market (CEOs) in xed supply. In reality, CEOs may
be able to nd jobs outside the CEO market, and rms may hire managers currently employed
in other sectors. We thus extend the model to allow for an elastic supply of talent. To do so
in a tractable way, we assume the existence of an integrated market between the corporate
sector and the non-corporate sector. The former represents the CEO labor market, and
the latter represents alternative jobs, such as entrepreneurship or consulting. We assume that
rms in both sectors initially have identical characteristics, and that the fraction of rms in the
corporate and non-corporate sectors are respectively 1   and . The probability that a rm
is in the corporate sector is drawn independently from the distribution of rm sizes.
Theorem 1 showed that, if the disutility of being a CEO at any rm rises from gn (an)
to gn (an) + , the level of pay is unchanged: while working for ones own rm becomes less
attractive, the outside option of being a CEO at another rm also becomes undesirable. We
revisit this prediction in the case where the CEO has an additional outside option, the non-
corporate sector, in which disutility is unchanged.
Proposition 5 (Outside Options) Suppose that the disutility of working in the corporate
sector rises from gn (an) to gn (an) +  for a small . Then:
18The dollar pay received by the CEO as a result of second-period performance is e2r2 . Substituting r2 =
ln (P2=P1) gives (P2=P1)
2 , which is convex in P2 if and only if 2 > 1.
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(i) Log pay in the corporate sector increases by 

:
(ii) The talent rank of a manager hired by rm n in the corporate sector rises from n to
n

1 + 



, i.e., the sector hires less talented workers.
(iii) The total loss of value creation (aggregate rm value gross of wages) by the corporate
sector is W 

, where W is the initial amount paid to CEOs in the corporate sector.
Proof See the Appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 shows that the log wage increases by 

. The intuition behind
the e¤ect of , , and  is the same as for their e¤ect on the pay equation (12), discussed
earlier: when  and  are large,  has a small e¤ect on the distribution of scaled size S; when
 is high, rms are more willing to pay to retain talent. Part (ii) shows that a corporate rm
hires a less talented manager. The intuition is similar to the distortion to CEO assignment
caused by moral hazard, discussed in Theorem 1. Since corporate rms must pay a premium
for the increased disutility of being a CEO, and the premium is multiplicative in the wage and
thus greater for more talented workers, corporate rms hire less skilled agents. The intuition
behind the e¤ect of  and  is the same as in equation (12); the dispersion of talent  has no
e¤ect since part (ii) refers to the talent rank of a manager. Part (iii) shows that the total loss
in value created by the corporate sector is increasing in the aggregate pay of corporate CEOs
W , for the same reason as in Proposition 2.
All three outcomes are increasing in , the size of the non-corporate sector, as this represents
the outside option. When outside options are larger, a higher wage premium is required to keep
a CEO within the corporate sector (part (i)). (When the corporate sector is the entire economy
( = 0), pay does not change, since CEOs have no outside option; this is the result from
Theorem 1.) This greater premium in turn leads to greater distortions in CEO assignment
(part (ii)) and consequently more value loss (part (iii)).
Finally, the model can be extended to consider other top management positions than the
CEO. For example, assume that there are integrated markets for all senior management posi-
tions (e.g., CEO, COO, CFO). If the disutility of being a CEO increases more than for other
executive positions (due to regulation or shareholder activism), then the pay for CEOs will rise
faster as a recompense. Similarly, if the CEOs potential impact on rm value has increased
faster than other managers (e.g., due to opportunities resulting from globalization), then the
optimal level of incentives becomes stronger, which necessitates paying the CEO a premium for
risk. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2010) argue that the CEOs high pay slice(proportion
of total executive pay earned by the CEO) may reect agency problems, but an alternative
explanation is that it represents compensation for disutility and risk.19
19See Dasgupta and Ding (2010) for another explanation for the increasing gap between the pay of CEOs and
other executives, based on the rise of search intermediaries for CEOs.
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2.3 A calibration
We now undertake an approximate calibration of the e¢ ciency losses in Section 1.3. We start
with the losses from second-best assignment under moral hazard, given in Proposition 2. As in
GL, we take  =  = 1 and  = 2=3 and consider the top 500 rms in Execucomp by aggregate
value. For 2005, aggregate ow compensation (tdc1 in Execucomp, winsorizing at the 5th
and 95th percentiles) is W = $5 billion.
We start with the estimation of LAlloc, given by equation (18). The key challenge is to
estimate 0n 0. This depends on the marginal cost of e¤ort, which is inherently unobservable
and we are unaware of any previous studies that estimate it. However, an advantage of our
unifying framework is that we can infer 0n   0 by using the wage equation (12). Taking logs
of this equation and rearranging yields:
yn = lnwn   (   =) lnSn;
where yn = k +


(n   ) and k is a constant. We have:
E

e yn=

= e k=E

e (n )=

= e k=
by denition of , so e k = E

e yn=

. Using E
h
e


(n )
i
= E

eyn k

, we obtain:
E
h
e


(n )
i
= E [eyn ]E

e yn=

. (31)
We use (31) as an estimate of E
h
e


(0n 0)
i
in equation (18). This yields an estimate
of LAlloc as $7.7 billion. We note two potential issues with our approach. The rst is that
equation (18) contains 0n 0, but (31) contains n . Recall that n = gn (an)+
 (2n2n)
2
and
0n =
 (2n2n)
2
, so we are implicitly assuming that gn (an) is the same across rms. Empirically,
cross-sectional variation in n from the average  may stem from variation in gn (an), but
the above approach attributes it entirely to di¤erences in 0n. Since LAlloc is increasing in
the variance of 0n, this has the potential to overstate LAlloc. One goal of the calibration is to
highlight that the losses from random assignment in Proposition 3 are signicantly greater than
those from second-best assignment in Proposition 2. Thus, by providing an upper bound on
LAlloc, this approach works against us by underestimating the di¤erences in losses.
The second caveat is that yn may be mis-measured in practice: although rm size and the
CEOs wage are observable, it may be that the CEOs actual wage di¤ers from his market
wage (e.g., if he is given deferred compensation). Again, measurement errors will overstate
LAlloc; moreover, we can estimate the likely magnitude of the resulting bias. Let yn denote
the true value and yn the observed value, and assume the classic errors-in-variables structure
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yn = y

n + un where y

n and un are independent. This yields the decomposition:
E [eyn ]E

e yn=

= E

ey

n

E

e y

n=

E [eun ]E

e un=

:
Using the notation  (y) = E [eyn ]E

e yn=

, the decomposition can be rewritten:
 (y) =  (y)  (u) :
The measured  (y) overstates  (y) by a factor  (u), which exceeds 1 by Jensens inequality.
To estimate the magnitude of the bias, suppose that u  N (0; 2u). Then,
 (u) = e
2
u=2

e
2
u=2
2

= e(1+1=)
2
u=2 = e
5
4
2u :
If the measurement error is moderate (e.g., u = 0:2), the bias is e
5
4
0:22 = 1:05 (i.e., only 5%).
Indeed, replacing w by a three-year average has little e¤ect on the results.
We now turn to LRA, given by (17). This requires an estimate of 0n alone, rather than
0n   0, and so we cannot use the above method. We thus infer the marginal cost of e¤ort
from observed contracts, under the assumption that rms are contracting e¢ ciently. In our
one-period model, where incentives stem only from newly-granted stock and options, n equals
the percentage change in pay for a percentage point return. In reality, the bulk of a CEOs
incentives stems from previously granted stock and options (see, e.g., Hall and Liebman 1998;
Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003). Hence, Edmans, Gabaix, and Landiers (2009) measure of
incentives is the dollar change in wealth for a one percentage point return, scaled by annual pay,
which they call BI .20 While BI measures the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the current period
return, the CEO bears risk from changes in the stock price during his entire tenure as CEO.
To convert BI into an estimate of , we assume the CEO works for L years and consumes only
at the end (we suppress the dependence on n for brevity). Then, the contract becomes:
ln c = 
LX
t=1
rt +K:
Thus, var (ln c) = 22L, and 0 =
 (22L)
2
. We also have
BI =
dWealth=dr
w
= 
Wealth
Wage
= R,
where R =Wealth=Wage, and since  = (dWealth=Wealth) =dr in a multi-period model.
To estimate the CEOs wealth, we start by taking data from Dittmann and Maug (2007),
20This dataset is available at http://nance.wharton.upenn.edu/~aedmans/data.html. Its construction is
described in Appendix B of Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009).
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who estimate the CEOs non-rm wealth that results from past salary and bonus awards,
and sales of stock and options previously granted by the rm.21 We then add the CEOs
current wealth invested in the rm, from stock and options, to give a total wealth measure.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain data on the wealth of U.S. CEOs that does not
stem from past or current executive compensation (e.g., real estate ownership or holdings of
other securities), but this is a reasonable benchmark. CEOs in 2005 have been in their current
position for a median of 5.0 years. This is an estimate of L=2 (since most CEOs will continue
in o¢ ce after 2005) and so it corresponds to L = 10. Taking the benchmark case of log utility
(  = 1) and using the exact expression (17) yields LRA = 0:40W = $2:0 billion.22 In sum,
the preliminary calibration suggests total e¢ ciency losses from imperfect monitoring (while
retaining optimal contracting) of approximately $9 billion, twice the aggregate CEO salary.
We now turn to the losses from random allocation, given in Proposition 3. We focus on the
case of M = 1 since this does not require estimation of the ns. Since this means that each
rm is guaranteed to end up with a top-500 CEO, our results will represent a lower bound. To
estimate 1
1  (in the denominator of (22)), we use the identity
23:
1
1   = E

S
S

j S  S

: (32)
Indeed, for an arbitrary size cuto¤ S in the support of S, P (S  xS j S  S) = x 1=, so
E

S
S

j S  S

=
Z 1
1
xx 1= 1
1

dx =
1

 x 1=+
1

  
1
1
=
1
1   :
Taking  = 1, the term E
h
S
S

j S  S
i
can be estimated as the mean rm size above a
cuto¤ S, divided by S. We dene S as the size of the median rm in our top 500 (the 250th
largest rm), which yields 5.3. From (22) we have LRand  5:2W= (5=3) = 3:1W  $16 billion.
This is markedly greater than the combined losses from second-best assignment in Proposition
21This dataset is available at http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm. We thank Ingolf Dittmann for
generously making this data available.
22Note that this method is not suitable for estimation of LAlloc: since 0n enters with a positive exponent,
LAlloc would be extremely sensitive to outliers in 0n resulting from outliers in volatility, wages, or stock and
option holdings. The estimation of LRA is much less a¤ected since 0n enters with a negative exponent. In
addition, as with any calibration, we assume real-world data is optimal and thus can be used to estimate n.
If, however, governance failures manifest in suboptimal contracting, our measure of n is inaccurate.
23Our calibration uses Zipfs law and constant returns to scale ( =  = 1). LRand in (22) is thus on the
cusp of being divergent and so we empirically implement 11  with (32). (Note that the divergence is weak
and logarithmic: the empirical counterpart of E
h
S
S

j S  S
i
is proportional to lnN when drawing from a
sample of N rms, as in Gabaix (2010): indeed our estimate of 5.3 is close to ln 500.) However, we directly use
the values  =  = 1 to calibrate  in the numerator of (22). Using the empirical average E
h
S
S

j S  S
i
to estimate  (by backing it out from equation 32) would be a very poor estimator as it has a formally innite
variance.
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2. Moreover, since our estimate of LRand is a lower bound (it assumesM = 1) and the estimate
of LAlloc is an upper bound, the true di¤erence is likely to be signicantly greater. Naturally,
the losses from both imperfect monitoring and random allocation will be signicantly higher if
we consider all top executives, rather than just the CEO.
Our analysis is related to some recent papers that estimate e¢ ciency e¤ects in a market equi-
librium, albeit of government intervention rather than governance failures. Dittmann, Maug,
and Zhang (2010) calibrate the impact of various forms of restrictions on CEO compensation,
such as taxes and limits on both ex ante salary and ex post realized pay, in an assignment
model with loss aversion and moral hazard; Llense (2009) calibrates the e¤ect of a pay cap in
the absence of an agency problem (in which case there is no distinction between ex ante and ex
post pay). Thanassoulis (2010) theoretically studies the e¤ect of restrictions on bankerspay,
such as taxes and limits on bonuses.
3. Conclusion
This paper studies how CEO assignment, pay, and incentives depend on talent, talent impact,
rm size, risk, and disutility in market equilibrium. The models closed-form solutions allow
the determinants of these three outcomes to be transparent, and clear empirical predictions. In
talent assignment models without an e¤ort conict, the most talented managers are assigned
to the largest rms. We show that this e¢ cient allocation is distorted in the presence of moral
hazard a rm that is riskier or involves greater disutility hires a less talented CEO. The loss in
e¢ ciency is decreasing in the dispersion of rm size and size elasticity of talent, and increasing
in the dispersion of managerial ability. If poor corporate governance instead manifests in a
random assignment of CEOs to rms, the losses are signicantly higher, and a¤ected by the
above parameters in the opposite direction.
Cross-sectional changes in risk and disutility increase the level of pay. Thus, risky rms not
only hire less talented CEOs, but also pay their CEOs highly (relative to their skill level) as a
recompense. However, aggregate changes in these variables have no impact as they a¤ect the
current rm and outside options equally. The strength of incentives is increasing in the disutility
of e¤ort, but independent of risk and risk aversion if the CEO only a¤ects mean returns. If
value-enhancing actions by the CEO also increase rm risk, the contract slope generally rises
and exhibits a positive relationship with both risk and risk aversion.
While a number of the models predictions regarding pay and incentives are consistent
with existing empirical ndings, some predictions regarding talent assignment are yet to be
tested (given the di¢ culties of measuring talent)24 and are potentially fruitful topics for future
empirical research. In terms of future theoretical directions, it would be interesting to extend the
24However, see Palia (2000), Acharya et al. (2010), Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010), Falato, Li, and
Milbourn (2010), and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) for promising approaches to measuring talent.
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analysis to a dynamic model where CEOs can be red or voluntarily move between jobs. Axelson
and Bond (2009) consider a dynamic market equilibrium under risk-neutrality, and Tsuyuhara
(2010) assumes homogeneous agents and rms. Whether tractability can be preserved under
the combination of dynamics, risk aversion, and skill di¤erences is an open question.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
This is a special case of Theorem 1 of EG. EG have the utility function u (v (c)  g (a));
our utility function (4) is a particular case of this with u (x) = e
(1  )x
1   and v (c) = ln c. We
refer the reader to EG for the full proof, which does not use rst-order conditions and rules out
contracts that are stochastic or depend on messages. Here we give a heuristic proof that conveys
the intuition, so that the intuition is self-contained within this paper. Given r = a+ + , the
agents expected utility is given by:
E [U ] = E
" 
c (a+  + ) e g(a)
1  
1   
#
:
Since  is known when the agent takes his action, we can remove the expectations operator.
The IC condition is thus:
a 2 arg max
a2[a;a]
c (a+  + ) e g(a). (33)
Taking the rst order condition yields:
c0 (a+  + ) e g(a)   g0 (a) e g(a)c (a+  + ) = 0,
i.e.,
c0 (r)
c (r)
= g0 (a) = :
Since this must hold state-by-state (i.e., for every possible  and r found on the equilibrium
path), this integrates to:
ln c = r +K:
Proof that maximum e¤ort is optimal if s is su¢ ciently large
Consider a CEO with a reservation utility u = u (ln vn), where vn is the e¤ectivedollar
wage (dened later in equation (9)). Call

; 

the support of ; f () its density, and F (x) =
P ( > x) the complementary cumulative distribution function. Dene
Qn  1
ean+n

g0n (an) + g
00
n (an) sup

F n ()
fn ()

eg
0
n(an)+(n n)g0n(an):
From condition (28) in EG (applied to b (a; ) = ea+ and v (c) = ln c, and eu
 1(u) = vn),
the rm wishes to implement a for all  if:
sn > Qnvn:
This condition requires rm value sn to be su¢ ciently large compared to the CEOs e¤ective
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wage vn.
Proof of Equation (8)
The CEOs wage is:
ln c = r +K =  (a+ ) +K = 0 +K 0,
with 0 = , K 0 = a+K. Thus his expected wage is:
w = E [c] = E
h
e
0+K0
i
= E
h
e
0
i
eK
0
= e
lnE
h
e
0i
+K0
:
His expected utility is:
Un =
1
1   E
h 
ce g(a)
1  i
=
1
1   E

e(ln c g(a))(1  )

=
1
1   E
h
e(
0+K0 g(a))(1  )
i
=
1
1   E
h
e(
0)(1  )
i
e(K
0 g(a))(1  )
=
1
1   e
(1  )
h
1
1   lnE
h
e
0(1  )
i
+K0 g(a)
i
:
Hence, with:
 
 
22

=2 = lnE
h
e
0
i
  1
1    lnE
h
e(1  )
0
i
;
we have:
Un =
1
1   e
(1  )
h
lnE
h
e
0i  (22)=2+K0 g(a)i
=
1
1   e
(1  )
h
 (g(a)+ (22)=2)+lnE
h
e
0i
+K0
i
=
1
1   e
(1  )[ +lnw]
=
(we )1  
1    :
The CEO receives the same utility as if he had to exert no e¤ort, and received a xed wage
we .
Proof of Theorem 1
This proof consists of four steps.
Step 1: E¤ective sizes. This is derived in the proof in the main paper.
Step 2. Distribution of e¤ective sizes. We use the notations
0 = ; n = n=0;  = =0:
We use the interpretation of n as a quantile to simplify the algebra. Since S (n) = An , the
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distribution of sizes follows P (S  x) = (x=A) 1=. Averaging over all n yields the following
distribution function for e¤ective sizes bSn = Sne n=:
bF (x) = P bSn  x = P  Sne n=  x = P  Sn  xen=
= E
h 
xen==A
 1=i
=
 x
A
 1=
E

e n=()

=
 x
A
 1=
e :
We will use the r to denote the rank in e¤ective size, and n for the rank in actual size. The
e¤ective size bS (r) of the rm of rank r satises bF bS (r) = r, i.e., the e¤ective size of the rm
of quantile rank r is: bS (r) = Ae r .
Step 3. Assignment in e¤ective sizes. A rm with e¤ective rank r optimizes over the talent
rank q of the manager it wishes to hire:
max
q
C bS (r)T (q)  v (q) ;
which yields C bS (r)T 0 (q)   v0 (q) = 0. In the competitive equilibrium, there is matching
between talent and e¤ective size, q = r. Hence:
C bS (r)T 0 (r) = v0 (r) : (34)
Let vN denote the e¤ective reservation wage of the least talented CEO (n = N). We obtain
the classic assignment equation (Sattinger 1993; Terviö 2008):
v (r) =  
Z N
r
C bS (u) T 0 (u) du+ vN :
Using the functional forms bS (u) = Ae u  and T 0 (u) =  Bu 1, we obtain:
v (r) = Ae 
0BC
Z N
r
u + 1du+ vN = A
e 
0BC

u 
0+
 0 + 
N
r
+ vN
=
ABC
0    e
 0

r (
0 )  N (0 )

+ vN .
In the limit (r=N)! 0, the term r (0 ) dominates the other two, and we have:
v (r) =
ABC
0    e
 0r (
0 ):
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Step 4. Wages. The rank of a rm with e¤ective size Sne n= is:
r = bF  Sne n= = Sne n=
A
 1=
e  =

Sn
A
 1=
en :
In other words, a rm with size rank n hires a manager with size talent rank r = nen  (at
least in the upper tail, i.e., in the domain of the power law specication). It pays an e¤ective
wage of v (r), and thus a monetary wage of:
wn = v (r) e
n
=
ABC
0    e
 0
 
Sn
A
 1=
en 
! (0 )
e
0n
=
A=BC
0    S
 =
n e
(n ):
Finally, substituting Sn = An
 
 , we obtain:
wn =
(Snn

 )
=BC
0    S
 =
n e
(n )
= D (n)S=n S
 =
n e
(n );
with D (n) =
nBC
  .
A su¢ cient condition for the risk premium to increase with the wage
Consider a general utility function U = e
(1  )(v(c) g(a))
1   where v is concave; the core model
corresponds to v (c) = ln c. From EG, the optimal contract is c = v 1 (r +K). From the
proof of equation (8) in The Appendix, we have:
E [U ] =
e(1  )(a+K+H)
1    ,
where H =  g (a)+ lnE e   (22) =2 < 0. Hence, v (e¤ective wage) = a+K +H, and
so the risk premium is given by:
w   f (a+K +H) ,
where f = v 1.
Suppose now that w increases a small amount  and r+K increases  such that w+ =
E [f (r +K + )]. The risk premium becomes w +    f (a+K +  +H). For the risk
premium to be increasing in w, we require:
w +  f (a+K +  +H) > w   f (a+K +H) ;
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i.e.:
 > f (a+K +  +H)  f (a+K +H) = f 0 (a+K +H)
since  is small. We have:
 = E [f (r +K + )]  E [f (r +K)] = E [f 0 (r +K)]
and so we require:
E [f 0 (r +K)] > f 0 (a+K +H) .
Since v is concave, f is convex and so f 00 > 0. Since also H < 0, it is su¢ cient to show that
E [f 0 (r +K)]  f 0 (a+K). Thus, it is su¢ cient for f 0 to be weakly convex (i.e., f 000  0) for
the risk premium to be increasing in the wage; multiplicative preferences are not necessary.
Proof that the market equilibrium is constrained-e¢ cient
We prove that if a social planner faces the same informational constraints as the agents in
the model (in particular, she cannot observe CEO e¤ort), she cannot nd a Pareto-dominant
allocation. Using the same argument as in the Proof that maximum e¤ort is optimal if s
is su¢ ciently large, for a given CEO-rm pair, the social planner wishes the CEO to exert
maximum e¤ort (because the benets of e¤ort are su¢ ciently large) and seeks the cheapest
contract that implements this e¤ort level. We have shown that this is the contract in Proposition
1. Given this, the market assignment is Pareto optimal, as is well-known (e.g., Gretsky, Ostroy
and Zame (1999)). For completeness, we provide a proof sketch.
Consider two rms a and b, who are matched in a decentralized equilibrium with two CEOs,
a and b. We normalize  = 1 and dene Ai = ei. Thus, if rm i hires CEO j, it must pay an
e¤ective wage vj and a dollar wage Aivj. Since rm a appoints CEO a rather than CEO b:
SaTa   vaAa  SaTb   vbAa, (35)
and likewise because rm b appoints CEO b rather than CEO a:
SbTb   vbAb  SbTa   vaAb. (36)
We study whether the social planner can achieve a Pareto improvement, i.e., increase total
production
P
TiSj net of wages, subject to each CEO j receiving a utility at least vj, the utility
given by the market outcome. If the planner pairs rm a with CEO b, while paying CEO a
at least vaAb (and doing the symmetrical arrangement for rm b and CEO a), the surplus he
achieves is SaTb + SbTa   vaAb   vbAa. By adding (35) and (36), this is weakly less than the
initial surplus, SaTa + SaTa   vaAa   vbAb. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
35
We start with LRA. We have:
LRA =
Z h
w (n)  w (n) e 0n
i
dn
= W  
Z
w (n) e 
0
ndn
= W  
Z
w (n) dn

E
h
e 
0
n
i
;
since 0n and w (n) are independent. This yields LRA = WE

1  e 0n :
Turning to LAlloc, as we have shown in the full proof of Theorem 1, a rm with size rank n
hires a manager with talent rank nen . Thus, bT (n) = T (nen ) and the value loss is:
LAlloc =
Z
CS (n)
 
T (n)  T  nen  dn:
Since T (n) = Tmax   B n, we have:
LAlloc =
Z
CS (n)
B

n
 
e(n )   1 dn:
As the n are drawn independently of S (n), we have:
LAlloc =
Z
CS (n) Bndn

1

E

e(n )   1 :
Next, we observe that Bn =  T 0 (n)n, and so:Z N
0
CS (n) Bndn =  
Z N
0
CS (n) T 0 (n)ndn
=  
Z N
0
w0 (n)ndn by (34)
= [  (w (n)  w (N))n]N0 +
Z N
0
(w (n)  w (N)) dn = WZ N
0
CS (n) Bndn =
Z N
0
(w (n)  w (N)) dn = W: (37)
This yields:
LAlloc =
1

E

e(n )   1W:
With small distortions, we can take Taylor expansions. As only n matters, it is su¢ cient
to consider the case E [n] = 0. The denition of  gives:
e  = E

e n

= E

1  n + 
2
n
2
+ o
 
2n

= 1 +
var (n)
2
+ o (var (n)) ;
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 =
 var (n)
2
+ o (var (n)) :
We next have:
E

e(n )   1 = E  (n   ) + 2
2
 
2n   2n+ 2

=  + 
2
2
E

2n

+ o (var (n))
=
var (n)
2
 
 + 2

+ o (var (n)) ;
and hence:
LAlloc  (1 + ) var (n)
2
W =
(1 + ) var (0n)
222
W:
Proof of Proposition 3
Using again 0 = , we observe that (37) yields:
W =
Z N
0
CS (n) Bndn =
Z N
0
ABCn +dn
= ABC
N1 
0+
1  0 +  :
Given T (n) = Tmax   B n, we have
T =
1
MN
Z MN
0
T (n) dn = Tmax   B
 (1 + )
(MN) :
Thus:
LRand =
Z N
0
CS (n) T (n) 
Z N
0
CS (n) Tdn
=
Z N
0
CS (n)

B
 (1 + )
MN   B

n

dn
=
Z N
0
ABC

n 

1
1 + 
MN   n

dn
=
ABC


n1 
0
1  0
MN
1 + 
  n
1 0+
1  0 + 
N
0
=
ABC

N1 
0+
(1  0 + )

1  0 + 
(1  0) (1 + )M
   1

=
W


1  0 + 
(1 + ) (1  0)M
   1

:
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Proof of Proposition 5
(i) In the corporate sector, n increases by , while it remains constant in the non-corporate
sector.  thus changes to:
0 =   lnE
h
e e0n=()i
=   lnE e en=()  (1  ) e =() + 
=   lnE
h
e e0n=()i   ln  (1  ) e =() + 
=    ln  (1  ) e =() +  :
Therefore, in the limit of small , we have:
0 = + (1  )  +O  2 :
From equation (12), the wage in the corporate sector changes by:
 lnwn =


(n  )
=


[   (1  ) ] +O  2
=


 +O
 
2

:
(ii) Given the Pareto rm size distribution S (n) = An , the number of rms with a size
greater than S is KS 1= for a constant K = NA1=.25 We normalize the initial  to 0. For
a non-corporate rm, the e¤ective size equals its actual size. Given the increase in disutility, a
corporate rm with e¤ective size S has real size Se=. Thus, the probability that a rm has
an e¤ective size greater than S is:
(1  )K  Se= 1= + KS 1=:
Thus, the talent corresponding to a rm with e¤ective size S is:
n0 = n+n = KS 1=

1  (1  ) 


+O
 
2

:
Hence, a corporate rm of size S and thus e¤ective size Se = hires a manager of talent (for
25The proof is thus. S = An  implies n = (S=A) 1= and thus n=N = (S=A) 1= =N . The left-hand side
n=N is the number of rms larger than S, and the right-hand side can be rewritten KS 1=.
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small ):
n0 = K
 
Se =
 1=
1  (1  ) 


= KS 1=

1 +




= n

1 +




:
(iii) The value created by the corporate sector is given by X =
R
CS (n)T (n) dn, for n in
the corporate sector. The loss of value creation in the corporate sector is:
 X =
Z
CS (n)T (n) dn 
Z
CS (n)T (n+n) dn
=  
Z
CS (n)T 0 (n)n


dn+O
 
2

=


W +O
 
2

;
since (37) showed that   R N
0
CS (n) T 0 (n)ndn = W .
Proof of Theorem 2
We dene V (r1; r2) = v (c (r1; r2)). At t = 2, the IC condition is:
a 2 argmax
a2
u (V (r1; a2 +  (a1) 2 +  (a1))  g1 (a1)  g2 (a2)) :
Note that there is no expectations operator here, since all noise has been realized when the
CEO chooses a2: this highlights the role of our timing assumption in achieving tractability. We
can thus remove u () to yield:
a 2 argmax
a2
V (r1; a2 +  (a1) 2) +  (a1)  g1 (a1)  g2 (a2) .
The rst order condition is:
@
@r2
V (r1; r2)  g02 (a) = 0;
which integrates to:
V (r1; r2) = K (r1) + g
0
2 (a) r2, (38)
for some function K (r1) to be determined.
We now consider the t = 1 IC constraint:
a 2 argmax
a2
E1 [u (K (a1 + 1) + 2 (a+  (a1) 2 +  (a1))  g1 (a1)  g2 (a))] , (39)
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where E1 is the expectation conditional on 1. From u (x) = e(1  )x= (1   ), we have the
following certainty equivalent formula for any constant x and random variable ey:
E [u (x+ ey)] = ux+ 1
1    lnE

e(1  )ey :
Applying this to (39) yields:
a 2 argmax
a1
u

K (a1 + 1) + 2a+
1
1    lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2+(a1))
  g1 (a1)  g2 (a)
for any 1. As above, we can remove the u function to yield:
a 2 argmax
a1
K (a1 + 1) + 2a+
1
1    lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2+(a1))
  g1 (a1)  g2 (a) :
Hence we must have:
K 0 (r1) +
d
da1
1
1    lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2+(a1))
  g01 (a1) ja1=a = 0;
which implies:
K (r1) = K0 + 1r1
for some constant K0, and:
1 = g
0
1 (a) 
1
1   
d
da1
lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2+(a1))

a1=a
= g01 (a)  20 (a1) 
1
1   
d
da1
lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2)

a1=a
:
Combining this with (38) yields:
V (r1; r2) = K (r1) + 2r2 = K0 + 1r1 + 2r2;
which generates the contract in Theorem 2.
Note that the above proof considers contracts that are message-free, deterministic, and
di¤erentiable. The techniques in EG formally prove that the optimal contract satises all of
these criteria.
In the limit of small noises, we have:
lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2)
  1
2
(1   )2 (2)2  (a1)2
and
1
1   
d
da1
lnE

e(1  )2((a1)2)

a1=a1
 (1   ) (2)2  (a1) (a1)0 :
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